Monday, February 26, 2007

The Nuclear Card, With A Twist

Feb/26/07
The Nuclear Card, With a Twist.

We are not alone in our long-held suspicion that the signature belligerence of North Korea, Iran and perhaps other would-be nuclear infants is tied less to paranoia, the perceived need of self defense or even visions of regional conquest, than to one of pure material gain. From John O’Sullivan of the Hudson Institute, "The US and its partners have told the rest of the world that one certain way to gouge aid out of the West and the US is to start a nuclearization program for the express purpose of receiving bribes to close it down." Or from the former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, "It’s a bad signal to North Korea and it’s a bad signal to Iran," Bolton said in an interview concerning the recent agreement with North Korea, noting that the message to would-be arms proliferators is that, "if you hold out long enough and wear down the Sate Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded." (In this case, North Korea offers phantom compliance in exchange for the US lifting of Treasury Department banking restrictions which had gone far to end the laundering of counterfeit bills to finance the regime.)
But can we turn this story; is there a twist? We need only return to President Reagan and the profundity of his policy making for the answer. He knew that the Soviets were a threat, bellicose, hostile but knew too that they were near bankrupt, and, dependent on the West for trade benefits, technology transfers and food. He used that dependency as a lever to force the regime to make a real choice - they would need to in fact reform their society, enhance basic human rights, that is, change their behavior towards their own people - simple but profound. Reagan did not respond to the Soviet’s agenda; he forced them to respond to his - the nurturing of a free society. It worked.
We can transform current North Korean and Iranian mischief, turning this strategy back directly on the thugs who brewed it by tagging our aid not just to non-proliferation, but to genuine change, not just international conduct, but domestic conduct. This should be the blue print for our negotiators. In fact a US bi-partisan group, which includes major members of the Korean-American community, scholars from the Brookings and Hudson Institutes, and the Executive Directors of Freedom House endeavors for just this sort of reformation under the North Korea Human Rights Act. As O’Sullivan explains, the Act argues that, "..the US should not merely respond to Kim’s agenda but should instead demand that human rights violations in North Korea be on the negotiating table...and requires that if concessions are to be offered to North Korea, then Kim must offer in return an improvement in the people’s rights as well as an abandonment of nuclearization." Given a hint of freedom, there will be the inevitable rush for more.
We must always remember that the birth of a consensual society anywhere in the world is in the direct interest of the United States - this has been for years and remains today a primary anchor at this center.
Robert Craven