Friday, November 17, 2006

IRAQ - 2007

IRAQ - 2007.

The pertinent exercise now is to anticipate US policy for Iraq. There are three anchors available providing background to help us succeed in that process:
First, in international affairs, we are motivated only by our own welfare. Anyone who has read Washington’s farewell address understands this to be true. We invaded Iraq to provide for our security. That was the motivation. Yet once there, providing for the security of others, efforts to sponsor democracy, if indeed secondary to the effort, are also in the direct interest of America - democracies do not war upon one another, nor foster terror.
Next, we now have as an anchor the advantage, the hindsight to grasp the reasons for recent failures. We did not anticipate the chaos in governing Iraq, nor the growth of insurgency. We thought democracy (see earlier writings) would "catch" early on. It did not because, as Charles Krauthammer summarized, after Saddam, "What was left... was a social desert, a dearth of the trust and good will and sheer human capital required for democratic governance....the culture of compromise too undeveloped to produce an effective government with any broad allegiance."
Finally, we expected stability and a quick victory over extremists, thugs in the guise of revolutionaries. Instead, US policy has been half ass, keeping as Bob Kagan of the Weekly Std put it,".. enough troops in Iraq to avert immediate disaster; and also to prolong the conflict, but not enough to make progress and avert the prospect of eventual disaster." All along, the American people heard of promised draw-downs but then saw security deteriorate, then the draw-downs were cancelled - on and on. And with the US unable to deliver security, the Iraqis have turned to their own armed groups for the same.
This is the landscape. How may it change? From recent leaks, and our own sources, we expect the following for 2007:
First, troop levels will be increased by 30,000, perhaps more. This will provide the necessary number to obtain the first objective of clearing and holding Bagdad, then the expansion outward to those areas where Sunni insurgency has most depleted security. No political solution is possible without the order that only American forces can provide.
Next, there will be more 1) money and 2) commitment from Congress to train Iraqi forces.
Finally, the US will look for an internal solution. The ruling Shiite have demonstrated only the lack of cohesion and failure. Thus, it is likely the US will push for an entirely new coalition, this one based on what Krauthammer calls cross-sectarian alliances - the more moderate Shiite elements, the Kurds, and those Sunnis "who recognize their minority status but are willing to accept an important, generously offered place at the table."
Look for this, or something close to this to appear in the headlines, near term.

Friday, November 10, 2006

HAMAS - An Update

11/10/06

HAMAS- An Update

In the 9/10/06 comment we predicted continued progress towards a peaceful solution; survival, starvation will trump ideology every time. Events are unfolding as expected.
Despite the recent killing of 18 Palestinian civilians by an errant Israel barrage, Hamas and the rival Fatah Party continue with talks. The exiled Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal called for a militant response to the killings but no one this time seems to be taking his comments seriously; indeed, as of this writing there have been no reprisal attacks. Ending the US-led boycott has assumed the #1 priority. Today, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh said he would step down from his post if the move would persuade the West to lift debilitating economic sanctions. Now that’s progress! This would not have been possible without 1) the US-lead push for a reformed, consensual government in the PA and 2) the Hamas electoral victory, seen on first blush as a disaster (except to our readers) but in reality a harbinger to peace in this region.

Robert Craven